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Abstract
We propose an agent-based model of collective opinion formation to study the wisdom of
crowds under social influence. The opinion of an agent is a continuous positive value, denoting
its subjective answer to a factual question. The wisdom of crowds states that the average of
all opinions is close to the truth, i.e. the correct answer. But if agents have the chance to
adjust their opinion in response to the opinions of others, this effect can be destroyed. Our
model investigates this scenario by evaluating two competing effects: (i) agents tend to keep
their own opinion (individual conviction β), (ii) they tend to adjust their opinion if they have
information about the opinions of others (social influence α). For the latter, two different
regimes (full information vs. aggregated information) are compared. Our simulations show
that social influence only in rare cases enhances the wisdom of crowds. Most often, we find
that agents converge to a collective opinion that is even farther away from the true answer.
So, under social influence the wisdom of crowds can be systematically wrong.
1 Introduction
Problems of collective decisions are tackled in different scientific disciplines, from biology to so-
ciology, from computer science to management science, from robotics to statistical physics. But
the overarching research interest is the same: Collective decision processes should, in the best
case, ensure an unanimous outcome, often denoted as consensus [5]. Taking a social perspective,
individuals likely have deviating opinions regarding a particular issue. But thanks to social in-
teractions during the process of collective opinion formation, individuals are able to adapt their
opinions such that eventually a majority converges to the same opinion. This ideal picture is dis-
torted in reality in several ways. To put forward the problem addressed in this paper: converging
to the same opinion does not imply converging to the right opinion. Collective decision processes
can easily converge to a consensus that is wrong in an objective sense, because of social influence
among individuals.
The term social influence encompasses several aspects that are underestimated, or not yet un-
derstood regarding their consequences for opinion dynamics [10]. For example, what is the role
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of social pressure, external influences, or affective involvement in collective decisions? Of partic-
ular importance is the question how individuals respond to the information they obtain about
the opinions of others. This question will be further addressed in our paper. For a systematic
investigation, we utilize agent-based models that allow to vary such responses and to study their
impact on the collective opinion.
Many agent-based models of opinion dynamics use a binary characterization of opinions, e.g.{0,1} or {−1,+1}. A particular class of stochastic models, the so-called “voter models” [6, 8], study
how agents respond to the frequencies of these opinions in a predefined neighborhood [2, 9]. In the
linear voter model, the majority rule assumes that the opinion of the (local) majority is adopted
with a probability directly proportional to the frequency of a given opinion. It can be shown
analytically that such assumptions usually result in consensus. The question thus is how long
it takes before this outcome is reached [38]. Interestingly, a slow-down of the opinion dynamics
on the agent level, i.e. a certain reluctance to change the opinion, can lead to a speed up of the
opinion dynamics on the systemic level: consensus is reached faster [37]. Also, the topology of
the social network that facilitates agent interactions has an important influence on the consensus
formation [26], as well as possible nonlinear responses to the frequency of opinions (e.g. minority
voting, voting against the trend, etc.) [35]. Eventually, such models can be extended to include
assumptions of social impact theory [17, 27], such as different weights of opinions, persuasion
from agents with different opinions and support from agents with the same opinion [15].
The advantage of this model class is its analytical tractability, in addition to computer simula-
tions, its disadvantage is in the many simplifications made [33]. More realistic models are based
on a continuous characterization of opinions, e.g. as positive real numbers in a given interval,[0,1]. The most prominent class of such models is the “bounded confidence model” that assumes
agents only interact if the difference in their opinions is less than a certain threshold ε [7, 14].
In this case, agents converge toward the mean of their opinions because of their interactions.
The possibility to reach consensus then depends on the value of ε [18]. To foster consensus,
assumptions about the topology of social interactions (e.g. group interactions) [25], hierarchical
decisions [28], the influence of in-groups (agents known from previous interactions) [13] can be
taken into account.
Still, this model class is rather abstract, focusing on effects on the conceptual level. Towards
more realistic models, the next step is to consider multi-dimensional opinions [30, 31]. Usually an
individual’s opinions on different subjects are not independent, but show correlations such that,
out of a multi-dimensional opinion space, characteristic dimensions, e.g. left-right, conservative-
liberal emerge [30]. In addition to the simple attractive force assumed in the bounded confidence
model (convergence toward the mean), now we have to consider also repulsive forces: agents
increase the distance of their opinions as a result of their interaction. In political space, this
often leads to polarized opinions [3, 21]. Consensus in such scenarios is a rare exception, studies
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rather focus on the possibility to obtain qualified majorities [1, 4, 12]. Such models, while more
complex, already allow to capture relations in real-world surveys. They can be further enhanced
by including the affective response of individuals and emotional influences [30, 36], in addition
to social ones.
In conclusion, to formally model collective decision processes, we can build on a number of agent-
based approaches at different levels of complexity. In this paper, we will use the second model
class described above, which uses a continuous opinion representation and a mutual convergence
of individual opinions, to describe a particular phenomenon of collective decisions, namely the
wisdom of crowds (WoC). It applies to scenarios with factual questions where a true opinion T
exists, even if it is not known to individuals [11]. Our running example: “How long is the border
between Switzerland and Italy in kilometers?” [19] has a true answer (734 km), while individuals
usually only have raw estimates. The WoC effect then states that the average over all individual
opinions is remarkably close to the true opinion. So, it denotes a purely statistical effect but,
interestingly, there is a lot of empirical evidence for it [16, 20, 29]. This is quantified by the small
collective error, E , which is the squared difference between the average and the true opinion.
According to Surowiecki [39], four criteria are required to form a wise crowd : diversity of opinions,
independence of opinions, some expertise, and the ability to aggregate individual opinions into
collective opinions. “Expertise” only refers to the basic ability to give a meaningful answer to the
question, e.g. the border of Switzerland is neither 0.1 kilometers, nor 3 million miles. The ability
to aggregate implies that someone, e.g. the social planner, indeed has access to all individual
opinions, to calculate the aggregate. The other two criteria are more important to us. The
diversity of opinions is large only if individuals have independent opinions. But what happens
if individuals obtain information about the opinions of others and then have the opportunity to
revise their own opinion? This question was investigated in a large empirical study [19], where
individuals had to answer the same question consecutively a number of times, while receiving
different information from others. In the so-called aggregated-information regime, they obtained
at each time step information about the aggregated opinion of others. In the full-information
regime, they instead obtained at each time step information about each individual opinion.
These two information regimes allowed them to revise their own opinion accordingly.
The study had two important findings: (i) In the presence of information about the opinions of
others, the group diversity of opinions drastically decreased. That means, individuals tried to
converge with their opinions, i.e. subjectively they got the impression to reach consensus. (ii)
Despite this convergence, the collective error, which measures the distance to the truth, did not
decrease, but increased. That means, the group collectively converged to an opinion which was
objectively the wrong one. This scenario, which was obtained quite frequently, is very dangerous
because the group, converging to a common opinion, was collectively convinced that the wrong
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opinion was the right one. This effect was stronger in the full-information regime compared to
the aggregated-information regime.
To answer the question, under what conditions this will happen, we need an agent-based model
that reflects these two different information regimes and further allows to vary the strength of
the social influence of other opinions, in comparison to the own conviction. The aim of our paper
is to provide such a model, as an extension of the bounded confidence model. In particular,
we want to model the full-information regime, which has shown the strongest effects, while the
aggregated-information regime is used as a reference case.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces our agent-based model of opin-
ion dynamics and relates it to macroscopic indicators to quantify the WoC effect. Section 3 then
presents the results of extensive agent-based simulations with respect to the three macroscopic
measures of the wisdom of crowds: the collective error, the group diversity of opinions, and the
WoC indicator. Finally, the main conclusions are summarised in Section 4.
2 Modeling the wisdom of crowds
2.1 Micro dynamics of opinion formation
With the term “micro dynamics” we refer to the dynamics of the system elements, i.e. the
agents. We build on the framework of Brownian agents [32], which considers that agents have
a continuous internal degree of freedom. In our case, this is the opinion xi(t), different for each
agent i = 1, ...,N . We assume that the values of xi can be mapped to non-zero positive real
numbers, i.e. xi(t) > 0, but are not bound to a defined interval. This reflects the experimental
situations described before [19].
These opinions can change over time because of influences from other agents or simply because
agents change their mind. xi(0) denotes the initial value. We propose the following general
dynamics [34]:
dxi(t)
dt
= −βxi(t) + 1
N
∑
j
Fij(t) + Si(t) (1)
This dynamics resembles the Langevin equation to describe Brownian motion, therefore we call
these Brownian agents. The term −βxi is a damping term, i.e. it describes, in the absence of
other influences, a relaxation process toward zero at a time scale β. The term Si(t) is an additive
stochastic force that describes random influences on the dynamics of opinions. We assume that
these fluctuations are centered around the initial opinion xi(0), to reflect the fact that individual
convictions about certain subjects are likely to be long-lived. Hence, ⟨Si(t)⟩ ∝ xi(0) up to a
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constant. We find it more convenient to rewrite the stochastic part as:
Si(t) = βxi(0) +Aξi(t) ; ⟨ξi(t) = 0⟩ ; ⟨ξi(t)ξi(t′)⟩ = δ(t − t′) (2)
ξi(t) is Gaussian white noise, i.e. it is not correlated in time and zero on average, A denotes the
strength of the stochastic force and is set equal to all agents.
The term Fij(t) eventually describes how the change of opinion of agent i is influenced by the
opinion of other agents j. To better understand its impact, let us first assume Fij(t) ≡ 0, i.e
agents do not have any information about the opinions of others. We call this the no-information
regime. It implies that agents update their opinions stochastically without considering any other
information. With Eqs. (1), (2) the opinion dynamics for this case simply reads:
dxi(t)
dt
= β [xi(0) − xi(t)] +Aξi(t) (3)
This stochastic equation denotes a standard Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process which also has an ana-
lytic solution [22]. In this case the time average of the individual opinion, xi(t), equals xi(0) for
large t with decreasing variance.
At difference with this trivial case, in this paper we discuss the case that agent i has full in-
formation about the opinions of others and can take these into account in weighted manner, to
update her own opinion. This is reflected in the following assumption for Fij(t):
Fij(t) = wij [xj(t) − xi(t)] (4)
That means the social influence from the opinion of other agents increases with the difference
between opinions. While this sounds like a simplified assumption, it has been empirically justified
in [24], therefore we use it here.
The coupling variable wij is chosen to be inversely proportional to the difference in opinions:
wij = Ni
1 + exp{∣xj − xi∣ /α} ; N −1i = N∑k=1 11 + exp{∣xk − xi∣ /α} (5)
with a normalization constant Ni, such that ∑Nj=1wij = 1. The parameter α acts as a measure
of the strength of the social influence in the population. Small values for α indicate that agents
are less susceptible to others’ opinions. Conversely, large values for α imply that even large
differences in opinons between agents do not matter much, therefore agents can resist stronger
social influence. In the limit case that ∣xj − xi∣ can be ignored, which is discussed further below,
we see from Eqn. (5) that for α → 0 also wij → 0, which makes sense. Further, for the relevant
range of values 0.2 ≤ α ≤ 0.8, wij ∝ α.
5/18
P. Mavrodiev, F. Schweitzer:
Enhanced or distorted wisdom of crowds?
An agent-based model of opinion formation under social influence
Submitted for publication
In summary, the stochastic dynamics for the opinion of agent i in the full information regime
becomes:
dxi(t)
dt
= 1
N
N∑
j=1
Ni
1 + exp{∣xj − xi∣ /α} [xj(t) − xi(t)] + β [xi(0) − xi(t)] +Aξi(t) (6)
To make the impact of individual conviction, represented by the second term including β, com-
parable to the impact of social influence, represented by the first term including α, we choose
parameter values 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and 1 ≤ β ≤ 2. The above dynamics does not easily lend itself to
analytical treatment, hence we will simulate it in Section 3. But to interpret the results, we first
need to think about some comparison.
2.2 Reference scenario
We want to compare our results to a reference case, in which agents have information only about
the average opinion of all other agents. We call this the aggregated-information regime [22, 23].
In this case the coupling variable wij is effectively a constant, equal for all agents: wij ≡ α. Then,
we can express the influence of other opinions as:
1
N
N∑
j=1Fij(t) = α [⟨x(t)⟩ − xi(t)] ; ⟨x(t)⟩ = 1N
N∑
j=1xj(t) (7)
where ⟨x(t)⟩ is denoted as the mean opinion in the following. Eqn. (7) results in the stochastic
dynamics:
dxi(t)
dt
= α [⟨x(t)⟩ − xi(t)] + β [xi(0) − xi(t)] +Aξi(t) (8)
We note that Eq. (8) bears similarities with the bounded confidence model [14, 18, 34], in which
agents update their opinion as follows:
dxi(t)
dt
= 1
N
∑
j
wbij [xj(t) − xi(t)] ; wbij = αΘ [zij(t)] ; zij(t) = ε − ∣xi(t) − xj(t)∣ (9)
The coupling variable wbij reflects that agents only influence each other if the absolute differences
in their opinions is smaller than a confidence interval ε. Θ[x] denotes the Heavyside function,
i.e. Θ[x] = 1 only for x ≥ 0 and Θ[x] = 0 otherwise. This means that agents consider the average
opinions of others, but take this average only over those opinion not to far away from the own
opinion.
Compared to this case, our aggregated regime considers the information of all other agents on a
given agent and therefore is similar to a mean-field limit. Additionally, the influence of the initial
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opinion and stochastic effects are taken into account.
2.3 Macroscopic measures for the wisdom of crowds
We remind that the wisdom of crowds (WoC) is expected to work if the diversity of individual
opinions is large, while the deviation of the average opinion from the true value T is small.
Therefore, in line with previous studies [19], we will use the collective error, E , the group diversity,D, and the wisdom of crowds indicator,W, as macroscopic measures to evaluate these conditions.
In order to define these measures, we need to keep in mind that the distribution of opinions in the
considered experimental setup is very broad, and can be proxied by a log-normal distribution.
Therefore, the average opinion is not well represented by the arithmetic mean, ⟨x⟩ = ∑i xi/N ,
but by the geometric mean, which is equivalent to the arithmetic mean of the log values, ⟨lnx⟩,
[19]. Further, because opinions change over time according to Eqn. (6), we are only interested in
the long-term (LT) values of these macroscopic measures.
The long-term collective error ELT shall be defined as the squared deviation of the average opinion
from the true value, T : ELT = [lnT − ⟨lnxLT⟩]2 , (10)
The long-term group diversity DLT is given by the variance of the distribution of opinions:
DLT = Var [lnxLT] = 1
N
N∑
i=1 [lnxiLT − ⟨lnxLT⟩]2 = ⟨[lnxLT]2⟩ − ⟨lnxLT⟩2 (11)
The WoC indicator W is measured by the deviation of the truth from the long-term median
opinion, xˆLT. This means that for N/2 of all opinions xiLT ≤ xˆLT holds, and xiLT ≥ xˆLT for the
remaining N/2. In plain words, the value ofW indicates how central the position of true value T
is within the distribution of opinions.W achieves a maximum value if the truth can be bracketed
by the two most central opinions.
More formally, if XN is the set of all N opinions, we have the set of ordered opinions, {x¯i∣x¯i ∈
XN , x¯i ≤ x¯j , ∀ i < j}. The indicator W is defined as max{i∣x¯i ≤ T ≤ x¯N−i+1}. It reaches a
maximum of [N/2] when the truth is either the most central opinion or is bracketed by the
two most central opinions, and a minimum of 0 when T ∉ (x¯0, x¯N). To illustrate this, let us
assume we have a set of 100 ordered opinions such that {1,2,3, ...,99,100}. The two most central
opinions in this set are 49 and 50, or 50 and 51, respectively. If the true value would be 50, it is
just bracketed by the two most central opinions. This would give us W = 50 = N/2. If the true
value would be 70, it is no longer bracketed by the two most central opinions. Instead it is 20
positions away from the central opinions, hence W = 30.
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2.4 Initial configuration and numerics
In order to perform agent-based simulations using Eqs. (6), (8) we need to specify the initial
distribution of opinions, from which N values xi(0) are sampled. We take as an input two
different log-normal distributions P (1)(x), P (2)(x) with two different mean values µ(1)lnx=-2.9 and
µ
(2)
lnx=-3.0, but the same variance σ
2
lnx=0.72. The histograms of the N = 100 opinions sampled
from these two initial distributions are plotted in Figure 1.
Further, we have considered three different true values, lnT =-2.00, lnT =-2.90, lnT =-3.12. With
these values and the parameters of the initial distributions, we can determine the initial collective
errors E(0) from Eqn. (10) and the initial group diversity D(0) from Eqn. (11). With these
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Figure 1: Histograms of initial opinions, xi(0), sampled from two different log-normal distribu-
tions. The blue lines indicate the different mean values µ(1)lnx=-2.9 (left) and µ(2)lnx=-3.0 (right),
the variance σ2lnx=0.72 is the same. Note the logarithmic values of the x-axis.
specifications, we run N = 100 agent-based simulations in parallel. The dynamics are solved
using the 4th order Runge-Kutta method for the full-information regime, Eqn. (6), and the Euler
method for the aggregated-information regime, Eqn. (8). We used a constant time step ∆t = 0.01,
and a final time t = 3000, to obtain the long-term values. The noise intensity was chosen as a
rather small value, A = 10−3.
3 Results of agent-based simulations
3.1 Collective error
We present all our results as heat maps of the relevant quantities, ELT, DLT or WLT, dependent
on the two model parameters, social influence, α, and individual conviction, β, for which we have
performed a thorough parameter sweep. The right column always refers to the full-information
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regime, the focus of our paper. The left column shows the matching results for the reference
case, the aggregated-information regime, which has been discussed in [23] regarding agent-based
simulations and in [22] regarding analytic solutions for the macroscopic measures.
Figure 2 shows the results for ELT for three different initial conditions (a)-(c). The color code
indicates the value of ELT: (red) for high values, which is bad, and (blue) for low values, which is
good. We note that for each plot the color code represents different values. A black line indicates
parameter combinations (α,β) for which ELT = E(0). Mostly, these lines are not noticeable
because they coincide with α = 0.
In Figure 2(a) the initial condition is chosen such that the average initial opinion is far away
from the true value, i.e. the initial collective error is high. Then, we find that an increase of social
influence α considerably decreases the collective error, which means it improves the wisdom of
crowds, whereas individual conviction has little impact on the outcome. This positive finding is
much stronger in the full-information regime, in which agents have access to the opinions of all
other agents. It decreases if they have access only to the aggregated opinion.
The situation inverts if instead the initial condition is chosen such that the average initial opinion
is close to the true value, i.e. the initial collective error is low. Then an increase in social influence
α can worsen the outcome, leading the average opinion farther away from the true value, as
shown in Figure 2(a). This is the most dangerous case: agents collectively converge to a common
opinion, but this, from an objective perspective, is the wrong one. This effect, again, is much
stronger in the full-information regime. In the aggregated-information regime, we could still
identify parameter ranges with low α, where the wisdom of crowds is not much distorted. But
more information for the agents destroys this possibility. Individual conviction, as the second
influential parameter, impacts the results mainly for the aggregated-information regime, but is
less noticeable in the full-information regime.
This leads us to the question why there is this monotonous deterioration of the wisdom of crowds
with increasing social influence. A theoretical investigation of the average opinion ⟨lnx(t)⟩ in the
aggregated-information regime [22] tells us that it can only increase over time, d ⟨lnx(t)⟩ /dt > 0.
Therefore, if initially ⟨lnx(0)⟩ < lnT , there is a chance that ⟨lnx(t)⟩ → lnT over time, if α
is large enough and β is not too strong. However, if initially ⟨lnx(0)⟩ > lnT , the interaction
dynamics of the agents can only lead their average opinion further away from the true value.
This is the case shown in Figure 2(b), and it becomes worse both if social influence increases or
if full information about the opinion of others is provided.
Consequently, we should also expect situations without a monotonous deterioration. This is
shown in Figure 2(c), which illustrates a non-monotonous dependence of the collective error on
the social influence. Here, the initial collective error is also low, as in (b), but now the initial
distribution of opinions is such that ⟨lnx(0)⟩ < lnT . Hence, we find that for low values of the
social influence the collective opinion indeed converges to the true value (indicated by deep blue).
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Figure 2: Agent-based simulations of the long-term collective error ELT (color coded) depen-
dent on the values of social influence α (x-axis) and individual conviction β (y-axis). (left)
Aggregated-information regime, Eqn. (8), (right) full-information regime, Eqn. (6). Param-
eters: N=100, t=3000, A=10−3, ∆t=0.01. Different initial conditions: (a) E(0)=0.80, lnT =-
2.00, ⟨lnx(0)⟩=-2.9, (b) E(0)=0.02, lnT =-3.12, ⟨lnx(0)⟩=-3.0, (c) E(0)=0.01, lnT =-2.90,⟨lnx(0)⟩=-3.0. Black contour lines indicate regions in the parameter space where ELT = E(0).
Note that these are vertical lines at α=0 in all plots, in (c) there is an additional line.
But the parameter range is rather small, and much smaller than in the aggregated-information
regime. Hence, we can conclude that only low social influence can improve the wisdom of crowds,
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whereas large social influence most likely deteriorates it.
The impact of the second model parameter, individual conviction β, becomes more visible for
the chosen initial conditions (c). Taking a fixed social influence, e.g. α=0.5, we find that indi-
vidual conviction can improve the collective error, because it acts as a kind of reluctance against
converging to the (wrong) collective opinion.
We also point to the visible black line which indicates the conditions under which the collective
error does not change, i.e. is equal to the initial value. In the full-information regime, this is
not a straight line as found for the reference case. That means, non-linear effects become much
stronger if agents have access to all other opinions.
3.2 Group diversity
The second macroscopic measure for the wisdom of crowds is shown in Figure 3, again in com-
parison to the reference case. Note that the long-term group diversity DLT does not depend on
the initial conditions, but only on (α,β) and ⟨δ2(0)⟩. Therefore the plot is the same for all initial
conditions shown in Figure 2. The color scale is chosen such that a large group diversity, which
is good, is indicated by red, whereas a small group diversity is shown in blue. We find that in the
full-information regime the group diversity is drastically reduced by means of social influence.
Its high initial value cannot be maintained, not even for the case of a high initial conviction β.
This becomes a problem for those parameter ranges, where a low group diversity is combined with
a high collective error. In this case, the agent population collectively converges to the (objectively)
wrong opinion. We see that this is most likely the case for the full-information regime, whereas
in the reference case the parameter range for acceptable values of the group diversity is much
larger.
3.3 WoC indicator
Finally we discuss the results for the long-term WoC indicatorWLT , which measures the distance
between the truth and the median of the opinion distribution. Ideally the true value should be
“central” with respect to the opinion distribution, which means for the given configurations, it
should have values around [N/2]=50. The color code is chosen such that (red) indicates good
values, (blue) a bad outcome.
Figure 5 presents the results for the full-information regime and the reference case, for two
different initial conditions, which are also sketched in Figure 4. Initial condition (a), which is the
same as in Figure 2(b), has a small initial collective error, but the true value lnT is smaller than
the initial collective opinion ⟨lnx(0)⟩ (which is not the median, but the mean). This implies, in
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Figure 3: Agent-based simulations of the long-term group diversity DLT (color coded) depen-
dent on the values of social influence α (x-axis) and individual conviction β (y-axis). (left)
Aggregated-information regime, Eqn. (8), (right) full-information regime, Eqn. (6). Parame-
ters: N=100, t=3000, A=10−3, ∆t=0.01. Initial condition: D(0)=0.72.
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Figure 4: Sketch of the initial opinion distribution (blue solid line) and the median (red solid line).
Two different initial conditions (also used in Figure 5): (a) W(0)=43, E(0)=0.02, lnT =-3.12.
(b) W(0)=46, E(0)=0.01, lnT = −2.9. Both: ⟨lnx(0)⟩=-3.0, D(0)=0.72. The position of the
final opinion distribution (blue dashed line) and the median (red dashed line) is determined by
the parameters (α,β). Despite the more favorable initial condition (b), a stronger social influence
α leads to a worse outcome.
accordance with the discussion of Figure 2(b) that the collective opinion cannot converge to the
true value. Further, lnT is not very central with respect to the initial distribution of opinions.
That means the initial WoC indicator is much lower than [N/2]=50, which corresponds to the
median. So, in summary, condition (a) reflects rather bad initial condition.
Initial condition (b), on the other hand, which is the same as in Figure 2(c), is comparably better
suited for reaching the true value. It also has a small initial collective error, but the true value
lnT is larger than the initial collective opinion ⟨lnx(0)⟩, which means the collective opinion
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can possibly converge to the true value. Further, lnT is more central with respect to the initial
distribution of opinions. That means the initial WoC indicator is much higher.
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Figure 5: Agent-based simulations of the long-term wisdom-of-crowds indicator WLT (color
coded) dependent on the values of social influence α (x-axis) and individual conviction β
(y-axis). (left) Aggregated-information regime, Eqn. (8), (right) full-information regime,
Eqn. (6). Parameters: N=100, t=3000, A=10−3, ∆t=0.01. Different initial conditions: (a)W(0)=43, E(0)=0.02. (b) W(0)=46, E(0)=0.01. Both: ⟨lnx(0)⟩=-3.0, D(0)=0.72.
Still, as we illustrate in Figures 4, 5, the more favorable initial condition (b) does not automat-
ically lead to a better wisdom of crowds. This is due to the opinion dynamics, which is rather
controlled by the parameters (α,β). Because of the interplay between social influence α and
individual conviction β, agents change their opinions such that (i) the final opinion distribution
becomes more narrow, and (ii) the mean ⟨lnxLT⟩ shifts toward higher values. How far it shifts
to the right depends on these two social parameters.
As Figure 4 indicates, even the better initial condition can lead to the worse outcome. This has
a systematic and a parameter dependent cause. As for the systematic one, because the collective
opinion shifts toward higher values, also the range of estimates needed to bracket the true value
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will increase. This explains why the WoC indicator most often ends up with lower than the initial
values.
The parameter dependence displayed in Figure 5 shows that in most cases an increasing social
influence α leads to a decreasing WoC indicator (blue region). This effect again is stronger
in the full-information regime. But an increasing individual conviction is able to mitigate the
deterioration.
For the initial condition (b), we observe a non-monotonous dependence of WLT on the strength
of the social influence, very similar to the dependence shown in Figure 2(c) for the collective
error. In this case, rather small values of α enhance the chance to converge to the true value,
which is shown by a high WoC indicator. Higher values of β are able to strengthen this effect,
enlarging the favorable red region in Figure 5(b), even in the full-information regime.
So, we can conclude that for both the collective error, Figure 2, and the WoC indicator, Figure 5,
we find the same parameter regions where social influence can be beneficial for the wisdom of
crowds. Provided suitable initial conditions, the collective opinion can even converge to the true
value, indicated by the minimum collective error, ELT = 0 and the maximum WoC indicator,WLT = [N/2]. Despite the loss of group diversity, shown by low values of DLT in Figure 3, the
crowd becomes “wiser” for moderate values of the social influence. It is non-trivial and interesting
to see that all observed effects are much stronger in the full-information regime, in comparison to
the reference case. Because the opinion dynamics is quite sensitive to the available information,
the parameter ranges for a favorable outcome considerably decrease in the presence of stronger
agent interactions, i.e. in the full-information regime.
4 Conclusion
The wisdom of crowds refers to cases in which a larger number of individuals has an opinion
about a question for which a true answer exists, although this is not public knowledge. Then, it
was observed already by Galton in 1907 [11] that the average opinion is remarkably close to the
true opinion. This works best if the diversity of individual opinions is large and all opinions are
independent. In most real-world scenarios, however, individuals become aware of the opinions of
others and then tend to adjust their own opinion based on this information. To model such an
opinion dynamics is the aim of the current paper.
We have proposed an agent-based model that reflects two competing influences: (i) the individual
conviction about the own initial opinion (parameter β), (ii) the influence of the opinions of others
(parameter α). The latter reflects a mutual social influence via the exchange of information.
Two different regimes are considered: a full-information regime in which agents get to know the
opinion of each other agent, and an aggregated-information regime in which agents only get to
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know the average opinion. The model assumes that agents have a stronger incentive to adjust
their opinion if the difference to other opinions, or to the average opinion, is larger. This is
reasonable: if someone thinks the length of the border between Switzerland and Italy is 500 km
and then sees many opinions with values between 2000 and 3000 km, there is a stronger “force” to
adapt to the majority (even that this is wrong: the true value is 734 km). This has been confirmed
by experiments, already [19, 24]. Hence, social influence eventually leads to a decreasing group
diversity of opinions. This is perceived as converging to some sort of consensus, which likely gives
more confidence in the outcome of the collective decision process.
Unfortunately, as the same experiments have also shown, because of this convergence crowds
easily convince themselves that their collective opinion is the right one, even if it is objectively
the wrong one. Thus, the main objective of our paper is to understand under which conditions
this distorted wisdom of crowds could emerge. Our agent-based model plays an valuable role
in systematically evaluating these conditions (a) regarding the parameters involved, and (b)
regarding the impact of the initial conditions.
Our results demonstrate that the role of social influence cannot be reduced to simplistic messages.
Instead, they reflect that collective opinion dynamics, as most social processes, are more complex.
Specifically, we do find scenarios in which social influence is beneficial for the wisdom of crowds.
If the average initial opinion is far away from the true opinion, i.e. the initial collective error
is large, social influence can help to reduce the collective error. But in cases where the initial
collective error is already small, social influence mostly distorts the wisdom of crowds, leading
to an increase of the collective error. There is only one situation, where the wisdom of crowds
can still be improved, namely if the initial average opinion is below the true opinion and the
social influence is very moderate. The dependency of the WoC effect on the initial conditions is
rather critical because, under practical circumstances, these initial conditions are unknown. This
means, we cannot have a-priori knowledge whether social influence will enhance or distort the
WoC.
Our insights help to explain the “range reduction effect” found empirically [19]. Because of the
adjustment of individual opinions, the opinion distribution, in particular its mean and its median
shifts over time such that the true opinion is displaced to peripheral regions of the opinion
distribution, while the collective opinion becomes narrowly centered around a wrong value. This
generates a dangerous situation because relying on the average opinion in this case would give the
wrong information. Our investigations show the range of parameters (α,β) where social influence
generates such outcome, effectively distorting the wisdom of crowds.
Comparing the full-information regime with our reference case, the aggregated-information
regime, we note that all effects are much stronger if the information about the opinions of
all agents becomes available. Individual conviction could counterbalance the social influence, but
plays a lesser role. This is also understandable: in the full-information regime, someone not only
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realizes the differences in opinions, in comparison to the own one, but also how many other
individuals deviate from it. This is hidden in the aggregated-information regime, where some-
one only knows the difference to the average opinion, hence its impact may be smaller from a
psychological perspective.
One could rightly argue against the latter point, because the wisdom of crowds only works with
respect to the average opinion which should be close to the true opinion. So, someone with a
basic understanding of the wisdom of crowds should find the average opinion much more reliable,
and influential, than knowing all other opinions. This argument ignores one main point: the
wisdom of crowds only works if we have a larger number of independent opinions. Only then, the
average opinion may generate the better signal. Once individuals get to know other opinions, their
opinions are no longer adjusted independently, but in response to the social influence generated.
Hence, even a small social influence has the potential to distort the wisdom of crowds, as it was
found in experiments and confirmed by our agent-based simulations.
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